10/9/79

17.9.1977

HIGHLIGHTS FROM MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1977, 21.00

1) Meeting took place in R. Palace in presence of K., P.M., F.M., Minister of Court, Touhami, MD, Joseph.

2) King opens that he is happy, humble and thankful, that this meeting has come about, and that MD has agreed to come.

Suhami

3) T. stresses that Sadat had no confidence in former Israeli Government, that your present is strong and will take dynamic decisions. Therefore, Sadat wants these talks and because he trusts us, he agreed to this contact with us.

4) T. Sadat sees the major precondition for peace in the evacuation of Arab occupied territories. If our P.M. agrees on principle to evacuate, we could talk and discuss all other items. But evacuation is the primary condition.

5) T. we could envisage meeting between Sadat and Begin, but only after the latter had accepted the principle of evacuation.

6) Guarantees, changes, all could be discussed, but only after we had agreed to Sadat's basical condition: Evacuation.

7) T. The Rumanian Ciaucescu had already proposed to Sadat that he should meet with Begin, but he had declined. Now, because of the King and because of his confidence in the Begin Government, Sadat agreed to this dialogue. Only after Begin will have accepted the principle of evacuation, will Sadat meet with him and shake his hands.

8) T. the Americans should not know of these contacts, but if we really come to an understanding, then it should be made out as if our agreement was the Americans' initiative, and then it should be handled as an American peace effort, as a "Face Saving" operation.

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9) T. Palestinians should be left to Egypt and the Arab Nations. Egypt will see it, that they will not become communists, "we shall not allow it", says T. They should have formal links with Jordan and Egypt and we should trust Sadat to control them.

10) T. Egypt will see to it that Palestinians will not become radical.

11) T. Sadat will agree to maximum guarantees, by Americans or others.

12) T. We (Egypt) would like to finish off all problems in the way of direct contact with us before Geneva, and come to Geneva only for signing formalities.

13) T. We should exchange our paper("Those we both give to Carter"), then meet again and discuss them, after each has studied the other papers. Next meeting should be "a working meeting".

14) T. We want to make a package deal, where all details are dealt with, and all could be finished off.

15) T. Jerusalem is very important. A solution to Jerusalem "would be proof of you sincerity. You would have all the Arab World at your side". But most important of all is evacuation of occupied territories.

16) T. We have confidence in you, we could reach a gentlemen agreement. But Sadat would meet Begin only, if latter accepts evacuation. As long as you occupy Arab land, how can he shake Begin's hands?

17) T. Places are negotiable. Administration is negotiable. But sovereignty is not.

18) T. Assad will first disagree, but will later accept Sadat's lead, especially if King Hussein is also of same, Sadat's opinion.

19) T. Question of Jewish villages in Arab sovereign areas could be examined and discussed.

20) T. Suggest meeting after having both studied the other's papers.

KING

1) Peace more important than any other issue in our time. Solutions can be found between Egypt and Israel. Assad will follow suit, once Sadat has agreed with us and he, the King, is behind the understanding.

2) But first we must talk together. This is he, King, that has put his full weight behind the contacts between our two sides.

3) Syria "would first shout", but later comply. And if it would not, "well we shall see".

4) Palestinians is mainly an Arab problem. They are a terrible trouble and a way must be found to solve the problem. But we, the Arabs, must really find the answer.

5) Sadat would come to meeting with Begin even before things are implemented, but Begin should basically agree to principle of evacuation and sovereignty.

6) After studying papers, progress should be made towards finding common ground. With you (Dayan) we can sit and talk. Let us not miss the opportunity.

7) We understand that the territories are now the only guarantee you have for your security. So let us search for the securities you need so you can return the land.

Laraki (Fgn. Minister).

Mainly substantiated the King's arguments as opposed to Touhami's.demands and susceptibilities.

CONCLUSIONS

It was concluded that:

1) MD will leave forthwith for Israel to report to His P.M. on Egyptian evacuation condition.

2) MD will ask his P.M. for approval of exchange of peace plans which were intended for President Carter.

3) If above is approved, a next "working meeting" between MD and Touhami will take place sometime around 27-28 or 29 September.

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ADDITIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1) Touhami said that diplomatic and full relations would be possible only after five years, to which the King quipped:"Why pin yourself down? Let us say some time, or a couple of years, but don't do yourself a bad service by putting up such obstacles".

2) Touhami's opinion on Nasser was of extreme and hateful despise. He asked MD is Nasser had been in connivance with him when Nasser sent Abd El Hakim Amer with an airplane to an inspection tour just when our planes attacked on 0800 of the morning of the 5 June 1967.

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4) Sadat had a deep feeling of confidence in Begin and Dayan, and would be prepared to deal with them as opposed to the members of the previous government.
